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RECENT DECISIONS
Art. IV, Domestic Relations Law, Laws of 1937, c. 669,8 which clear-
ly expressed the right of a married woman to maintain a tort action
in her own name.
The technical distinction made in Singer v. Singer seems out of
accord with the legislative intent of Section 6.015 to place women
on a basis of equality before the law. If as a practical matter this
construction should cause hardship, the legislature should amend the
statute giving definite equality as to right to sue similar to that exist-
ing in New York.
LAVERNE L. REICHOW.
Taxation-Immunity of Federal Property from State and Local
Taxes.&-In reversing a Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision, in
United States & Mesta Machine Co. v. County of Alleghany, 64
Sup. Ct. 908,88 L.Ed. 845 (1944), the United States Supreme Court
reaffirmed the long standing immunity of federal property from state
and local taxes.-
In the present case the war department contracted with Mesta
Machine Co. for the manufacture of ordnance. 2 Since the plant was
not equipped for this type of work, it was agreed that the additional
machinery required should be furnished at Government cost and re-
main the property of the United States. Machinery was to be ac-
quired by Mesta as independent contractor by purchase; Mesta could
manufacture it; the government could furnish it. That which was
bought or built was inspected and compensated by the government
and title was to vest at delivery at site of work and inspection and
acceptance. For rental of one dollar the government leased to Mesta
6 N. Y. STAT. Art. IV, No. 57, Domestic Relations Law, Laws of 1937. "Right
of action by or against married woman and by husband or wife against the
other, for torts-A married woman has a right of action for an injury to her
person, property or character for an injury arising out of the marital rela-
tion, as if unmarried. She is liable for her wrongful or tortious acts, her hus-
band is not liable for such acts unless they were done by his actual coercion or
instigation; and such coercion or instigation shall not be presumed, but must
be proved. A married woman has a right of action against her husband for
his wrongful or tortious acts resulting to her in any personal injury as defined
in section 37a of the general construction law, or resulting in any injury to
her property, as if they were unmarried, and she is liable to her husband for
her wrongful or tortious acts resulting in any such personal injury to her
husband or to his property, as if they were unmarried.
1 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819), which case involved the state's
right to tax issues of notes of a bank of the United States. The Court held it
a tax on the means of the government to execute one of its powers and the
sovereignty of the State did not extend to those means.
2 Clallam Co. v. United States, 263 U.S. 341, 44 Sup. Ct. 121, 68 L.Ed. 328 (1923).
Held that a state could not tax the property of a corporation organized by
Federal Government by act of 1918 for production of war materials, the
property which is conveyed to it, or bought with money of the United States.
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and placed in its building equipment and machinery which was to be
removed under government direction at the termination of the con-
tract. To Mesta's previously determined assessment for ad valorem
taxes, the County of Alleghany, Pa., added the value of the machinery.
Mesta paid under protest the tax attributable to this increased assess-
ment and took an appeal to the Court of Common Pleas which held
that the machinery was owned by the United States and therefore
for constitutional reasons could not be included. The Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania reversed the decision and reinstated the assessment
holding that it was not against the United States but against Mesta,
operating for private purposes. Under state law this machinery for
purposes of assessment was considered as part of the real estate upon
installation, and it was deemed that the United States had only a
reversionary interest.
The United States entered the case as an intervener and both it
and Mesta appealed, the United States to protect its sovereignty and
Mesta tc protect itself from unlawful burdens placed on property
in its possession as bailee. The Supreme Court had jurisdiction of
the appeal. 3
The Court held that war procurement policies settled under fed-
eral authority could not be limited by local law. Despite the claim
that the United States had no delivery of possession or perfected title
as required by state law, such property became exempt federal prop-
erty upon inspection and approval.4
The county contended that the tax was not on the machinery but
only on the land whose value was enhanced. However, it was held
that the real nature of a tax, rather than characterization by state
courts or legislatures determines the effect of the tax on federal
right,5 that the validity and construction of contracts through which
the United States is exercising its constitutional functions is a ques-
tion of federal law not controlled by the law of any state, 6 and that
here the machinery was valued separately and added to the land
328 U.S.C. A. 344(a).
4 Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 United States Constitution. Art. I, § 8, cl. 18; Art VI, cl. 2.
5 Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 50 Sup. Ct. 121, 74 L.Ed. 478 (1929). Held
that the Supreme Court is not bound by characterization given to a state tax
by state courts or legislatures where a Federal right is concerned.
6 Clearfield Tr. Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 63 Sup. Ct. 573, 87 L.Ed.
838 (1942) ; Board of Comr's. of Jackson Co. v. United States, 308 U.S. 343,
60 Sup. Ct. 285, 84 L.Ed. 313 (1939); Utah Power and Light Co. v. United
States, 243 U.S. 389, 37 Sup. Ct. 387, 61 L.Ed. 791 (1916); United States v.
Ansoria Brass & Copper Co., 218 U.S. 452, 31 Sup. Ct. 49, 54 L.Ed. 1107 (1910) ;
D'Oench, Dehme & Co. v. F.D.I.C., 315 U.S. 447, 62 Sup. Ct. 676, 86 L.Ed.
956 (1941) ; Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190, 60 Sup. Ct. 480, 84 L.Ed. 694
(1939) ; Federal Land Bank v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 62 Sup. Ct.
1, 86 L.Ed. 65 (1941).
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assessment and therefore in effect a tax was laid on United States
property.7
Early cases held that immunities had attached to the income or
property or transactions of others because they dealt with or acted
for the government."
In recent cases immunity for the contractor's own property, profits
and purchases has been denied. 9 Mesta was in the position of a bailee
7 Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329, 63 Sup Ct. 297, 87 L.Ed. 304 (1942).
Held that giving federal estate tax lien on property passing at decedent's death
priority over an innocent mortgagee, while relieving from the lien bona fide
purchasers of property transferred inter vivos in contemplation of death, is
not such discrimination as to violate the due process clause of the 5th amend-
ment.
8 Dobbins v. Commissioners, 16 Pet. 435 (1842); Collector v. Day, 11 Wall.
113 (1870); People of St. of N.Y. ex rel Rogers v. Graves, 299 U.S. 401, 57
Sup. Ct. 269, 81 L.Ed. 306 (1936). Held Federal Government may use a cor-
poration as a means to carry into effect powers granted by the constitution.
Osborn v. Bank, 9 Wheat. 738 (U.S. 1824); Owenboro National Bank v.
Owenboro, 173 U.S. 664, 19 Sup. Ct. 573, 43 L.Ed. 850 (1898). Held a state is
without power to tax national banks, except under permissive legislation of
congress; Choctaw 0. & Gulf R. Co. v. Harrison, 235 U.S. 292, 35 Sup. Ct. 27,
59 L.Ed. 234 (1914). In this case appellant leased and operated mines to
which the Indians had title. Held, that gross revenue tax on coal miners or
producers equal to percentage of gross receipts from total coal produced is a
privilege tax which cannot be exacted from a federal instrumentality acting
under congressional authority. Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501, 42 Sup.
Ct. 171, 66 L.Ed. 338 (1921). Jaybird Mining Co. v. Weir, 271 U.S. 609, 46
Sup. Ct. 592, 70 L.Ed. 1112 (1925). Held that ore in possession of a lessee
which was taken from restricted property of a Quapaw Indian leased by the
government for development, from which the interests of the Indian have not
been segregated, is not subject to state taxation. Federal Land Bank v. Cros-
land, 261 U.S. 374, 43 Sup. Ct. 385, 67 L.Ed. 703, 29 A.L.R. 1 (1922). Western
Union Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U.S. 460, 26 L.Ed. 1067 (1881). Held the
telegraph company is an instrument of interstate commerce and the state cannot
tax its occupation by placing a specific tax on each message sent out of the
state, or sent by public officers on United States business. Indian Motorcycle
Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 570, 51 Sup. Ct. 601, 75 L.Ed. 1277 (1930). A
sale of motorcycles to state agency for use in municipal police service is
exempt from excise tax on sale of motorcycles by the manufacturer. LeLoup
v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640, 8 Sup. Ct. 1380, 32 L.Ed. 311 (1887). Pan-
handle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 48 Sup. Ct. 451, 72
L.Ed. 857, 56 A.L.R. 583 (1927). Graves v. Texas Co., 298 U.S. 393, 56 Sup.
Ct. 818, 80 L.Ed. 1236 (1935). N. W. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. State of Wisconsin,
275 U.S. 136, 72 E.Ed. 202 (1927) Held a franchise tax on gross receipts of
insurance company was not applicable to receipts derived from interest on
United States bonds. Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet. 449 (U.S. 1829). United
States v. Richert, 188 U.S. 432, 23 Sup. Ct. 478, 47 L.Ed. 532 (1902) Held im-
provements made on lands to which United States held title but which were
put in possession of Indians for their benefit remained immune from taxation.
Cal. v. Central Pa. R.R., 127 U.S. 1, 32 L.Ed. 150 (1887) Held that since Con-
gress has authority in exercise of its power to regulate commerce among the.
several states to construct or authorize individuals or corporations to con-
struct railroads across the states and territories, an assessment of franchises
conferred by United States was repugnant to the Constitution and laws of the
United States.
9 State. of Alabama v. King and Boozer, 314 U.S. 1, 62 Sup. Ct. 43, 86 L.Ed.
3, 140 A.L.R. 615 (1941). Question was whether King and Boozer, as sellers
of lumber for construction of army camp for the United States, were infring-
ing constitutional immunity of the United States from state taxation, by the
exaction of a sales tax for which the seller was liable but which was to be
19441
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
for mutual benefit and has some legal and beneficial interest in the
property. When all the government has is a title and nominal in-
terest, the whole value would be taxable to the equitable owner.10 No
attempt was made to segregate lessee-bailee's interest and therefore
the tax was unlawful. The tax might have been sustained if the basis
had been the taxpayer's leasehold on the government property or the
increase in the value of the land because of the machinery.
Mr. Justice Roberts and Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented on the
ground that the court should follow state courts on non-federal ruling
that the tax was on the contractor, that it was an ad valorem tax on
the realty, and that increased cost to government is no unlawful
burden."'
The federal government by constitutional grant has the inherent
power to raise and support armies. No method by which it was to
carry out this power was prescribed. The machinery in the Mesta
case is an instrumentality to carry out the power to supply the army
of the United States with arms. 61 Corpus Juris 372, "State taxation
of instrumentality of federal government is not objectionable if it
does not impair their usefulness or efficiency or hinder them from
serving the government as they were intended to serve it." Just how
a nondiscriminatory tax on the instrumentality in the present case
would impair its usefulness is not shown. This is in accord with the
dissenting opinion.
Ifi 61 Corpus Juris 230 it is said that there is no reason why func-
tions which could be accomplished by private corporations should be
tax free. Had the government chosen to buy armaments from Mesta
who furnished its own machinery, the machinery would be taxable
although the burden, in increased sales price, finally would be .borne
by the purchaser, the United States.
In the principal case, the court said: "Benefits which a contractor
receives from dealings with the government are subject to state income
collected from the buyer. Held-It was not infringed although the economic
burden of the tax was on the United States. Graves v. N. Y. ex rel O'Keefe,
306 U.S. 466, 59 Sup. Ct. 595, 83 L.Ed. 927, 120 A.L.R. 1466 (1938). Held that
a nondiscriminatory income tax on salary of examining attorney for HOLC,
doesn't put unconstitutional burden on the federal government. James v.
Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 58 Sup. Ct. 208, 82 L-.Ed. 155, 114 A.L.R.
318 (1937). Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 58 Sup. Ct. 969, 82 L.Ed. 1427
(1937). Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp, 303 U.S. 376, 58 Sup. Ct. 623,
82 L.Ed. 907 (1937).
10 City of N. Brunswick v. United States, 276 U.S. 547, 48 Sup. Ct. 371, 72 L.Ed.
693 (1927). At termination of the war, property of the United States Housing
Corp. organized to provide housing for war workers, was sold. Taxes the city
assessed were unpaid and corp. refused to execute deed. Corp. held legal title
only and therefore equitable owner was to pay the tax.
n Nickel v. Cole, 256 U.S. 222, 41 Sup. Ct. 467 (1920); State of Alabama v.
King and Boozer, 314 U.S. 1, 62 Sup. Ct. 43, 86 L.Ed. 3, 140 A.L.R. 615 (1941) ;
James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 58 Sup. Ct. 208, 82 L.Ed. 155,
114 A.L.R. 318 (1937).
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taxation. Salaries received from it may be taxed. The fact that ma-
terials are destined to be furnished to the government does not exempt
them from sales taxes imposed on the contractor's vendor. But in all
of these case what we have denied is immunity for the contractor's
own property, profits, or purchases." However, since the legal title
of the machinery was in the United States and its ownership for
assessment purposes had not been separated from that of the tax-
payer, the property of the federal government was being taxed.
Wi-. Central R.R. Co. v. Price,12 held that a state has no right
to tax property of the United States within its'limits but every title
in property whether inchoate or complete when vested in an individual
is taxable unless expressly exempt. In Van Brocklin v. Tenn.,13 it
was held that immunity protected the private owner where Tennessee
attempted to sell for state taxes lands which the United States owned
at time taxes .were assessed and levied but in which it had ceased to
have any interest at time of sale because the tax had been laid against
an interest of the government which was beyond the state's taxing
power. A recent case held that an attempt by the Territory of Alaska
to levy and collect taxes on cannery and fish traps used on the Annette
Island Reservation through a lease between the Secretary of the
Interior and Annette Island Packing Co., was void for it constituted
a tax on an instrumentality of the United States used in the per-
formance of its duties to its Indian wards.' 4
In effect application of the immunity ruling of the Mesta case
would seem to give lessors a tax advantage over those who own their
property. It would be expedient, therefore, that the the war acquired
industrial property of the government be sold back into private own-
ership. If this is not done, it would seem that since the industrial
plants valued at about 15 billion dollars acquired by federal govern-
ment during the war should not remain permanently immune from
state and local taxes, the local community, in order to offset the loss
occasioned by this immunity, should make the taxpayer's leasehold
the basis of the assessment. This method might be applied also in
case of surplus government property which will probably be leased
after the war.
CORInULA SCHOMMER.
12 133 U.S. 496, 10 Sup. Ct. 341, 33 L.Ed. 687 (1889).
13117 U.S. 151, 6 Sup. Ct. 670, 29 L.Ed. 845 (1886).
14Territory v. Annette Island Packing Co. (Fall, Secretary of the Interior,
Intervenor), Wickersham, 6 Alaska 585 (1922).
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